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the hellenistic synagogues, the raw materials for a Divine Wisdom Christology subservient to a High Priestly Christology were already at hand when the writer to the Hebrews laid hold of an early creed or hymn in order to introduce his statement concerning the dignity of Jesus as Son and Priest.

One other observation may be made on the basis of I Clement 36:1. Clement applies to "Jesus Christ, the high priest" the description "the defender and helper of our weaknesses." This qualification may owe something to expressions in Hebrews 2:10-16 and 4:14-16, where the writer stresses Jesus' identification with men and women of flesh and blood and his ability to empathize with "their weaknesses" and to offer appropriate help in response to their call. Beyond that, it offers support to the proposal that one function of the Divine Wisdom Christology in Hebrews 1:1-4 is to underscore Jesus' ability to sustain the people of God in a period marked by peril and stress.²²

III. *The Distinctive Emphasis of Hebrews 1:1-4.*

What then is distinctive of the christological statement of Hebrews 1:1-4? The writer gave to a cluster of ideas in hellenistic Judaism christological precision. In contrast with the figure of Divine Wisdom or the Logos theology of hellenistic Judaism, the writer boldly applies the categories of wisdom to a historical figure, Jesus. When this was first done within the hellenistic church it marked a new departure in the history of ideas. Whether the writer to the Hebrews was the creative theologian who gave this insight its pristine formulation is impossible to determine at this stage, but he appears to have been responsible for bringing together wisdom motifs and priestly motifs in a carefully articulated statement concerning the dignity and achievement of the Son of God. Divine Wisdom Christology leads into a presentation of High Priestly Christology and establishes a firm christological foundation for all that the writer has to say concerning the character and demands of the revelation mediated by Jesus Christ. The joining of wisdom and priestly notes in the presentation of Jesus provides to the readers the assurance of Jesus' sustained concern for them and his ability to vindicate the people of God when they become objects of contempt in a hostile world.

22. V. Neufeld, op. cit., 136f., observes that "the verbs which introduce ὁμολογία [in Hebrews], particularly κρατεῖν and κατέχειν, as well as the general argument of the letter, indicate that the *homologia* has the function of promoting or preserving faithfulness in a time of difficulty and persecution."

Chapter 10

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Propositional Relations

1. *Introduction*

In a connected speech or discourse, the individual statements, commands, and questions of the discourse are not put together higgledy-piggledy, like boulders scattered over the ground after the passing of a glacier. Rather, they are *organized*, consolidated, connected to one another by certain relations. Consider what happens to Mark 3:31-35 when one puts the same sentences in a different order.

And he replied, "Who are my mother and my brothers?" And a crowd was sitting about him. "Whoever does the will of God is my brother, and sister, and mother." And standing outside they sent to him and called him. And looking around on those who sat about him, he said, "Here are my mother and my brothers!" And they said to him, "Your mother and your brothers are outside asking for you." And his mother and his brothers came.

What is happening here? The rearrangement of Mark has destroyed some of the organization and connectedness that Mark's original account possessed. Then what sorts of organization did Mark 3:31-35 have in the first place? How do we talk about and appreciate this organization of Mark? How is the organization of Mark related to the organization of other discourses?

The intent of this paper is to develop, by gradual stages, means for talking about one type of organization common to Mark and other discourses. The system of analysis that I am introducing does not come from me alone. As far as I am aware, a method of this

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type was first developed by Traina (1952:49-55). It has since been modified and refined by Fuller (1959:V-1-VII-11), Beekman (1970; 1978), Beekman-Callow (1974:267-342; 1977), the Hollenbachs (1973a; 1973b; 1974), Grimes (1974), Ballard-Conrad-Longacre (1971a; 1971b), Longacre (1972; 1976:98-164), and Hughes (1975).[†] I have in turn introduced my own modifications.

The analysis of propositional relations is one aspect of a larger complex of procedures that I have chosen to call "rhetorical analysis." My form of "rhetorical analysis" exhibits only faint resemblances to the classic discipline of rhetoric or the more recent "rhetorical criticism" (Kennedy, 1972; Sider, 1971; Muilenburg, 1969; Greenwood, 1970; Kessler, 1974; Jackson, 1974; cf. Cleary-Haberman, 1964).[†] But I do share with these disciplines a concern for understanding the unfolding patterns in the development of a paragraph or a discourse. One means of coming to grips with these patterns is the analysis of propositional relations within a discourse.

2. Framework

To conduct an analysis of discourse organization more consistently, more deeply, and more clearly, it is convenient to work within a framework of assumptions about discourse. I cannot here undertake a justification or complete explanation of these assumptions, but content myself with a brief listing of them.¹

a. Discourses are organized wholes in which the parts are related to one another and to the whole. This is seen from comparing Mark 3:31-35 with a jumbled rearrangement.

b. Discourses have three distinct but interlocking types of organization: phonological (or graphical), grammatical, and referential (sometimes called semological) (Pike, 1977:3). In the following discussion, I shall be concerned almost exclusively with referential organization. Referential organization is that type of organization preserved when one carefully paraphrases the discourse.

[†] Editor's Note: For more specific bibliographical information, see the references at the end of this chapter.

1. For foundational discussion of the assumptions, cf. especially Pike (1967).

As an example of referential organization, consider Mark 1:27a.

And they were all amazed,	Cause
so that they questioned among themselves.	Effect

The two clauses are related by a relation of cause and effect. The same relation could also be expressed with different grammatical structures:

And they were all amazed.	Cause
So they questioned among themselves.	Effect

They questioned among themselves,	Effect
for they were all amazed.	Cause

And they were all amazed.	Cause
Therefore they questioned among themselves.	Effect

or even as follows:

And they were all amazed.	Cause
They questioned among themselves.	Effect

Even without an overt marker like "so that," "so," or "therefore," the reader may still discern a cause-effect relation. The cause-effect relation is an instance of referential organization.

c. The referential structure of a discourse is hierarchical (Pike, 1973:3). That is, smaller referential units are organized into larger ones, which in turn are organized into still larger ones. I follow Beekman-Callow (1977) in thinking that there are three main levels of units. There are *concepts* like "they" or "amazed," *propositions* like "they were all amazed," and *paragraphs* like Mark 1:27. Propositions can be organized into proposition clusters, which are organized into paragraphs. Paragraphs can be organized into larger paragraphs and sections. The term "proposition" is not used, either here or elsewhere in this paper, in the sense of formal logic. Rather, it simply denotes a minimal stretch of discourse that says something about something.

d. With some qualifications, the main types of relations that relate propositions to one another are the same as those relating paragraphs and sections to one another. Hence, in the discussion below, I will ignore the differences between propositions, proposi-

tion clusters, and paragraphs. I will use examples from all three of these levels to illustrate the main types of referential relations. For convenience, the term "proposition" will sometimes be used to denote proposition clusters and paragraphs as well as true propositions.

e. The referential structure or referential hierarchy has three aspects: rhetorical, motific, and analogical. In this paper, I limit myself to the rhetorical structure. This means that particular attention will be paid to how the speaker says what he says, and the order in which he says it, rather than merely to the subject-matter about which he is speaking. A full explanation of this distinction is not possible here.

My scriptural examples will be taken from the Revised Standard Version. Since I am using these only for illustration, I will not raise the question of whether the RSV has properly construed the propositional relations as they stand in the original Greek or Hebrew.

3. *Rough Distinctions*

Propositional relations are of three major types. (1) There are relations of dynamicity, that is, cause-effect relations. (2) There are relations of determinateness or definiteness, where two or more propositions are connected to one another primarily by the fact that they share a common topic. Frequently, one proposition will help to define, delimit, or argumentatively reinforce another. (3) There are relations of coherence, where two propositions are connected chiefly by the fact that they denote events or states connected in time or space. Here are examples of the three types:

- | | | |
|---|--|----------|
| (1) They were distressed in rowing,
for the wind was against them. | Effect
Cause | Mk. 6:48 |
| (2) Now John was clothed with camel's
hair,
and had a leather girdle around
his waist. | Regarding John's clothing
Regarding John's clothing | Mk. 1:6 |
| (3) And he went up into the hills,
and called to him those whom he
desired. | Antecedent
Subsequent | Mk. 3:13 |

Note that in both Mark 1:6 and Mark 3:13, the conjunction "and" connects two clauses. Yet the propositional relations between

the clauses are different in the two verses. In Mark 1:6 there is a relation of determinateness; in Mark 3:13 there is a relation of coherence. A single type of *grammatical* construction (namely, connecting clauses with "and") has been used to express two *different* types of *referential* construction, that is, two different types of propositional relation. This is in fact a common phenomenon. On the one hand, grammatical conjunctions do sometimes tell one a great deal about propositional relations. For example, the phrases "as a result," "for," and "so that" generally express relations of dynamicity. On the other hand, sometimes grammatical expressions can be used to express more than one kind of propositional relation. In these latter cases, one must pay attention to the *content* of the propositions as well as to the connecting conjunction or connecting phrase. The referential content, that is, the content such as would be expressed by a careful paraphrase, is decisive for propositional relations. The grammatical form which this content takes is *not* decisive. It is not even relevant, except insofar as it expresses a referential notion.

3.1 *Relations of dynamicity (cause-effect)*

Relations of dynamicity are generally the easiest to identify. In these cases the speaker indicates that the event designated by one proposition is a cause or at least an influencing factor in the production of the event designated by the other proposition. The cause must be temporally prior to the effect. The indication that there is a cause-effect relation may be explicit ("so that," "for") or implicit (when one can reasonably infer the presence of cause-effect from the account).

With authority he commands even the unclean spirits, and they obey him.	Cause Effect
--	-----------------

The explicit link between the two propositions is "and." Yet we easily infer the presence of a loose causal connection, inasmuch as the obedience of the spirits is a response called forth by Jesus' command. On the other hand, consider Mark 1:9:

In those days Jesus came from Nazareth of Galilee and was baptized by John in the Jordan.	Antecedent Subsequent
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In this case there may well be a causal connection in the actual facts of the case. Jesus may have come from Nazareth *in order to* be baptized by John (cf. Matt. 3:13). But the text of Mark does not say that. It could *perhaps* be inferred that there was a cause-effect relation. But, in this case, I judge that the "perhaps" is not really strong enough to deserve notice in my classification.

3.2 Relations of Determinateness (Regarding X)

Propositional relations of a second kind are the relations of determinateness. These include cases where one proposition helps to define or limit another:

It was reported that he was at home.	Regarding a report Regarding a report	Mk. 2:1
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Also included are cases where there is argument from one fact to another:

If you will, you can make me clean.	Regarding a cleansing Regarding a cleansing	Mk. 1:40
--	--	----------

David himself calls him Lord; so how is he his son?	Regarding the Christ Regarding the Christ	Mk. 12:37
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Sometimes such an argumentative relation itself presupposes an underlying cause-effect relation:

Jesus' willing will <i>cause</i> the leper to be clean.	(for Mk. 1:40).
Christ is not simply David's son. As a <i>result</i> or <i>effect</i> of this fact, David is led to call him Lord.	(for Mk. 12:37).

In these two reformulations, the cause-effect relation is made *explicit*. Hence, they would be marked Cause-Effect. But in Mark 1:40 and 12:37 as they stand, this is not the case. Rather, the *argument* from one proposition to another is central. In general, the essence of an argumentative type of propositional relation is not a cause-effect relation. Rather one has to do with an argument from one proposition to another on a given topic. In relations of dynamicity, what is prominent is, if you will, a connecting "arrow" of movement from an earlier event (cause) to a later event (effect). An

argument, however, may infer either event from the presence of the other, or may infer one of two simultaneous events or states from the presence of the other. This is a special type of relation of determinateness. In relations of determinateness what is prominent is a commonness of topic which two propositions share in contrast to others.

3.3 Relations of coherence (co-occurrence)

For relations of coherence, what is primary is the occurrence of two events or maintenance of two states in the temporal or spatial vicinity of one another.

And the unclean spirit, convulsing him	Co-occurrence	
and crying with a loud voice, . . .	Co-occurrence	Mk. 1:26
And passing along by the Sea of Galilee,	Co-occurrence	
he saw Simon and Andrew the brother of Simon	Co-occurrence	Mk. 1:16

No doubt most if not all of these propositional relations could be seen as involving some shared topic. For Mark 1:26, the topic might be things done by the unclean spirit. What matters is that simultaneity or successiveness in time, or proximity in space, are in such instances more emphasized than topic.

In the case of relations of coherence, then, the speaker of the discourse views the connection between the two propositions primarily as an external one or extrinsic one. Two events or states share a common *environment* in space or time. On the other hand, for relations of determinateness, the connection between the two propositions is viewed primarily as internal or intrinsic. The two share a common subject-matter. For relations of dynamicity, the connection is primarily neither environmental nor topical, but causal.

4. Use of rough distinctions in outlining

Each of the three major types of propositional relations (dynamic, determinate, and coherent) can be subdivided into more precise

categories. These more precise categories are the goal towards which I am moving (sections 5-7). But if one desires, even the rough distinctions introduced so far can be used to enrich the analysis of a passage.

As an example, take the passage Isaiah 51:9-11. Let me suppose that, using criteria concerning the integrality, the prominence, and the organization of this discourse, I have already analyzed it into the form of an ordinary outline.

I. The arm of the Lord rises to deliver (9-10)

*A. The arm of the Lord should awake (9a-g)

1. Awake and put on strength (9a-d)

*a. Awake (9a-b)

(1) Awake (9a)

(2) Awake (9b)

b. Put on strength (9c-d)

*2. Awake as you did long ago (9e-g)

*a. Awake (9e)

b. You did it long ago (9f-g)

(1) You did it of old (9f)

(2) You did it generations ago (9g)

B. The arm of the Lord divided the sea (9h-10)

1. The arm of the Lord cut up the dragon (9h-j)

a. The arm of the Lord is the one (9h)

*b. It cut up the dragon (9i-j)

*(1) It cut Rahab in pieces (9i)

(2) It pierced the dragon (9j)

*2. The arm of the Lord made a path in the sea (10)

a. The arm of the Lord is the one (10a)

*b. It made a path in the sea (10b-e)

(1) It dried up the sea (10b-c)

(a) It dried up the sea (10b)

(b) It dried up the waters (10c)

*(2) It made a path for the redeemed (10d-e)

*(a) It made a path in the sea (10d)

(b) The redeemed passed over (10e)

*II. The redeemed shall return to Zion with joy (11)

A. The redeemed shall return (11a)

*B. The redeemed shall come to Zion with singing (11b-e)

1. They shall come to Zion with singing (11b)

*2. They shall have everlasting joy (11c-e)

*a. Everlasting joy shall be on their head (11c)

b. Joy and not sorrow will be theirs (11d-e)

(1) Exaltation and joy will come on them (11d)

(2) Sorrow and sighing will flee away (11e)

In this outline, asterisks mark the more prominent subdivisions.

If the ordinary outline above has been done correctly, to analyze Isaiah 51:9-11 in terms of propositional relations takes only one more step. Any two propositions, propositional clusters, or paragraphs under the same major heading are directly or indirectly related to one another in terms of propositional relations. For example, all the propositions under the general heading "A. The arm of the Lord should awake (9a-g)" are related to one another. Under this heading, the most direct relation occurs between the two subheadings on the next lower level; that is, between "1. Awake and put on strength (9a-d)" and "2. Awake as you did long ago (9e-g)." The connection between these two propositional clusters is a topical one. They are both concerned with the waking of the arm of the Lord. Hence, the relation between the two is a relation of determinateness. That fact can be indicated by labeling both "1. Awake and put on strength (9a-d)" and "2. Awake as you did long ago (9e-g)" with the symbol "Re" (an abbreviation for "Regarding the same subject-matter"). The two are then connected by lines as follows:

1. Awake and put on strength (9a-d)

Re
Re

2. Awake as you did long ago (9e-g)

Similarly, take "1. Awake and put on strength (9a-d)" as the major heading. Under it are two subheadings, "a. Awake (9a-b)" and "b. Put on strength (9c-d)." How are these two related to one another? The event described by the second proposition is pre-

sumably chronologically after the event described by the first proposition. But I judge that it is not merely a matter of chronology in this case. The arm is to awake *in order to* put on strength. So the two actions are causally intertwined. In this case, the earlier event will be labeled with the symbol "Cs" (cause) and the later event with the symbol "Ef" (effect). Thus:

a. Awake (9a-b)



b. Put on strength (9c-s)

In general, the Cs-Ef symbols will be used to label any relations of dynamicity.

Finally, relations of coherence will be labeled with the symbol "Co" (for "co-occurrence") beside the relevant propositions. Thus:


A. The redeemed shall return (11a)



B. The redeemed shall come to Zion with singing (11b-e)

When this is done for all the groups of propositions and paragraphs in Isaiah 51:9-11 the result is as follows (see chart on next page).

Of course, in practice, one seldom starts with an ordinary topical outline that is fully satisfactory. When a topical outline is drawn up, questions are then raised about what is most prominent among two or three neighboring units under the same heading. Questions are also raised about what the propositional relations are among the units. Both of these types of questions may lead to a revision of the outline, because aspects of the passages that were ignored or put in the background in drawing up the outline are now being considered. Hence, questions about the form of the outline (the integrality and determinateness of the passage), questions about prominence, and questions about propositional relations (the organization of the passage) cannot be cleanly separated. Each contributes to the answering of the others. To some degree, all three types of questions should be worked on simultaneously.



Diagramming Isaiah 51:9-11 in the above way can increase one's awareness of how the passage is organized and how the different parts reinforce one another or are in tension with one another. It forces one to ask questions about the relation of different parts to one another. Many of us are not used to asking such questions. Hence being forced to ask them can help us to notice things about the passage that we might otherwise glide lightly over.

The reader may still rightly harbor doubts as to the degree of usefulness involved in the threefold distinction among relations of dynamicity, or determinateness, and of coherence. This threefold distinction is indeed a "rough" distinction only. By subdividing the three major classifications into a series of 25 or so subclassifications, we can obtain a more refined set of propositional relations. This set is large enough to include most of the main distinctions that occur in the languages of the world (Longacre 1976:98-101).

The next three sections, then, are devoted to subdividing the three major types of propositional relation. Section 8 provides a summary display of the types of propositional relations delineated in all three of these sections.

5. *Fine distinctions: relations of dynamicity*

Relations of dynamicity have earlier been described as cause-effect relations. The event described by one proposition causally influences or is causally connected with the event described by another. The earlier event is the "cause" and the later event is the "effect." But causal connections are here being spoken of vaguely. The connections can be of several kinds. First, there are connections in which someone (usually a principal agent) *intends* that a given effect should issue from a cause. Second, there are connections between some causes and their *actual* effects even in cases where no intention is suggested. Third, there are connections where the effect is *not* normally expected from a given starting event. The first type will be labeled Engagement-Purpose (Eng-Pur), the second Reason-Result (Rsn-Rst), and the third Concession-Contraexpectation (Ccs-Cex).

5.1. *Engagement-Purpose (Eng-Pur)*

(Beekman calls this means-purpose; 1974:302)

In the case of the Engagement-Purpose relation, an agent involved in the action *intends* that one event (the purpose) should issue from another (the engagement). Thus:

"But that you may know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins"—	Pur	
he said to the paralytic—. . .	Eng	Mk. 2:10f.

And they watched him, to see whether he would heal him on the sabbath,	Eng	
so that they might accuse him.	Pur	Mk. 3:2

And they watched him, to see whether he would heal him on the sabbath	Eng	
	Pur	Mk. 3:2

And he told his disciples to have a boat ready for him because of the crowd, lest they should crush him.	Eng	
	Pur	Mk. 3:9

In all instances of the Engagement-Purpose relation, two propositions are involved. One proposition, labeled "Engagement," refers to a cause. The second proposition, labeled "Purpose," refers to an effect. An agent involved in the events *intends* that the cause should bring about the effect. But the discourse does not necessarily indicate that the effect *actually* took place. It indicates only that it was *intended* to take place. The agent performs or enters upon the "engagement" part of the action *in order that* the purpose part should take place. The intention of the agent is the key element distinguishing Engagement-Purpose relations from the other major types of cause-effect relations (e.g., Reason-Result, Concessions-Contraexpectation).

One can test for the presence of an Engagement-Purpose relation by seeing whether the phrase "in order to" or "in order that" can appropriately introduce the Purpose proposition. Thus one might paraphrase the second and third examples by saying:

And they watched him, to see whether he would heal him on the sabbath,
in order that they might accuse him.

And they watched him,
in order to see whether he would heal him on the sabbath.

The last of the examples, from Mark 3:9, is classified as a case of Engagement-Purpose because the clause "lest they should crush him" is virtually equivalent to "in order that they might not crush him."

And he told his disciples to have a boat ready for him
because of the crowd,
in order that they might not crush him.

In Greek, *hina*, *eis* + articular infinitive, and the genitive infinitive are often used to indicate the Engagement-Purpose relation.

5.11. *Means-End (Mns-E)*

(Beekman calls this means-result; 1974:301)

The Means-End relation is the special case of the Engagement-Purpose relation when the effect, or purpose, is not only an *intended* effect but also the *actual* effect. That is, the agent's intentions are actually realized. Here are some examples.

You have a fine way of rejecting the commandment of God, in order to keep your tradition!	Mns E	Mk. 7:9
And Peter took him, and began to rebuke him.	Mns E	Mk. 8:32
Send them away, to go into the country and villages round about. . . .	Mns E	Mk. 6:36
We know that our old self was crucified with him so that the sinful body might be destroyed, . . .	Mns E	Rom. 6:6
sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin in the flesh.	Mns E	Rom. 8:3

More explicitly, the Means-End relation is a relation between two propositions. One proposition, the "Means," refers to a cause. The other proposition, the "End," refers to a corresponding effect. An agent *intends* that the cause should issue in the effect. Moreover, the two propositions taken together as they stand in the discourse indicate that the effect actually does take place. Thus it is not quite enough to say that the effect actually takes place. The correct formulation is that the discourse *implies* or *indicates* that the effect takes place. Moreover, the discourse must not merely indicate somewhere *else* that the effect takes place. The "actuality" of the effect must

be indicated or implied somehow in the way that the propositions are organized together, in the immediate context.

If one is dealing with a fictional narrative, or a future prediction, or some other case where the cause as well as the effect is hypothetical, the conditions are altered accordingly. In such cases, the discourse must indicate or imply that, were the cause to take place, the effect would be both an intended and an actual result.

For example, in Mark 7:9 and 8:32 the text implies that the effect actually occurs. In contrast in Mark 6:36 neither the cause (Jesus sends the people away) nor the effect (the people go into the country . . .) actually occurs, because the whole thing is simply a proposal on the part of the disciples. But from the disciples' point of view, if one had happened, the other would have happened also.

In short, what distinguishes Mns-E is not merely that the effect happens. What distinguishes Mns-E is that the discourse at the point in question actually affirms *that* the effect happens, or (as in Mark 6:36) that the connection between cause and effect is an actual and not merely intentional connection. In Greek, *hina* can be used for this in certain circumstances (cf. Mark 7:9). But *hoste* (normally indicating *actual* effect) can also be used for Mns-E, if an agent's intention is indicated in context by some other means.

I have chosen to describe Means-End as a special type of Eng-Pur relation, but to give it its own special designation. Alternately, the Means-End relation could be seen as a case intermediate between Eng-Pur (emphasizing intended effect) and Rsn-Rst (emphasizing the *actual* effect). The difference between Mns-E (where there is an expressed intention) and Rsn-Rst (where there is not) should be carefully noted.

5.2. *Reason-Result (Rsn-Rst)*

(Beekman calls this reason-result; 1974:301)

For the Reason-Result relation, there is a connection between a cause (the Reason) and its *actual* effect (the Result), but the discourse does not indicate that the effect was intended. The following are examples of the Reason-Result relations.

Follow me	Rsn	
and I will make you become fishers of men.	Rst	Mk. 1:17
And they were astonished at his teaching,	Rst	
for he taught them as one who had authority	Rsn	Mk. 1:22
And they were all amazed,	Rsn	
so that they questioned among themselves, . . .	Rst	Mk. 1:27
Moved with pity,	Rsn	
he stretched out his hand and touched him, . . .	Rst	Mk. 1:41

One can test the presence of a Reason-Result relation by seeing whether the phrase "as a result" can be appropriately inserted just before the Result portion of the relation.

And they were all amazed.

As a result, they questioned among themselves.

He was moved with pity.

As a result, he stretched out his hand and touched him, . . .

In cases like that in Mark 1:22, where the Result is mentioned first in the discourse, the order of the two parts must be reversed for the same test of inserting "as a result" to be applied.

He taught them as one who had authority.

As a result, they were astonished at his teaching.

To make a similar test for the case of an imperative like "follow me," the imperative needs first to be turned into a corresponding indicative (cf. 9:1).

You will follow me.

As a result, I will make you become fishers of men.

A somewhat similar but less reliable test is to see whether "so that" can be appropriately inserted between the two propositions. In Greek, *hōste*, *oun*, *dia touto*, and *dio* frequently indicate a sequence of Reason followed by Result. *Gar* is sometimes used for Result followed by Reason (Healey, 1976).

5.21. Stimulus-Response (Stm-Rsp)

(cf. Beekman's "conversational exchanges"; 1974:292)

I introduce Stimulus-Response as a special kind of Reason-Result

relation. In the Stimulus-Response relation, the causal connection is felt to be a weak one. An element of human volition generally enters, so that the Response cannot at all be *predicted* from the Stimulus. The following examples should illustrate what I have in mind.

With authority he commands even the unclean spirits,	Stm	
and they obey him.	Rsp	Mk. 1:27

Jesus withdrew with his disciples to the sea,	Stm	
and a great multitude from Galilee followed.	Rsp	Mk. 3:7

(He) began to proclaim in the Decapolis how much		
Jesus had done for him;	Stm	
and all men marveled.	Rsp	Mk. 5:20

The Response event involves a different principal agent from that of the Stimulus. An element of volition and therefore independence enters through this agent. Hence, in general, the Response is not so closely bound to the Stimulus as is the case in other cause-effect relations.

One can test for the presence of a Stimulus-Response relation by seeing whether the phrase "in response" can be appropriately inserted just before the Response portion of the relation. Question and answer, and command and execution, are both special instances of Stimulus and Response.

I have said that the causal connection in a Stimulus-Response relation is a relatively weak one. The Stimulus-Response relation can therefore be seen as intermediate between the Reason-Result relation and a pure chronological relation of Antecedent-Subsequent (cf. 7.1). Different agents are involved in the Response and in the Stimulus. But one event, the Response, is "stimulated" by the other, the Stimulus. The one event, the Stimulus, is a cause in drawing forth the other. In such cases I treat the propositional relation as a cause-effect relation and label it as Stimulus-Response. Only when no causal connection is indicated in the discourse do I classify the relation as Antecedent-Subsequent.

5.3. *Concession-Contraexpectation (Ccs-Cex)*

(Beekman calls this concession-contraexpectation; 1974:305)

The Concession-Contraexpectation relation is a cause-effect relation. But, in this case, the effect is contrary to what one normally expects. This is an "although" situation. Although x happens, z follows (instead of y, which one expected from x). Thus:

And he said to them, "Is it lawful on the sabbath to do good or to do harm, to save life or to kill?"	Ccs	
But they were silent.	Cex	Mk. 3:4
The man who had been possessed with demons begged him that he might be with him.	Ccs	
But he refused, . . .	Cex	Mk. 5:18f.

The earlier event, or cause, is referred to in the proposition labeled "Concession." The later event, or effect, is referred to in the proposition labeled "Contraexpectation." Ordinarily, the "Concession" event can be expected to lead in some direction y. The actual effect, the "Contraexpectation" event, is *not* in the direction y. Hence, a surprise or frustration occurs.

The presence of this relation can be tested by trying to insert "although" before the Concession part of the relation, or by trying to insert "in spite of this" before the Contraexpectation part of the relation.

The Ccs-Cex relation should be carefully distinguished from another relation, the Opposition relation (6.231). In the case of Ccs-Cex there is an implied causal connection, and the Concession event must precede the Contraexpectation event in time. In the Opposition relation there is no such restriction, since it is a matter of simple contrast between two facts.

5.4. *Summary of relations of dynamicity*

Relations of dynamicity are distinguished from one another by several factors: (a) the presence or absence of an agent's *intention* that one event should result in another; (b) the affirmation or non-

affirmation of the fact that the effect *actually* took place following the cause; (c) the degree of coherence between the cause and its effect. There are three degrees of coherence: positive, when the effect flows smoothly from its cause; negative, when the effect is contrary to the cause; and "neutral," where an element of new human agency enters into the production of the effect, thereby making it less rigidly attached to its cause. The distinctions can be diagrammed as follows:

	<i>Actual</i> Rst	<i>Intention</i>	<i>Coherence</i>
Eng-Pur	—	+	+
Mns-E	+	+	+
Rsn-Rst	+	—	+
Stm-Rsp	+	±	0
Ccs-Cex	+	—	—
Grd-Imp	(+)	(+)	+
Cnd-Cq	—	—	+

For comparison, I have inserted two other propositional relations, Grounds-Implication and Condition-Consequence, which are not cause-effect relations, but are sometimes confused with them.

More clues as to the differences among the different types are summarized in the following (an adaptation of Beekman-Callow, 1974:300—see table on next page).

6. *Relations of determinateness*

In relations of determinateness, two or more propositions share a common topic. One proposition helps to define, delimit, or argumentatively reinforce another. As might be expected, a considerable variety of propositional relations fall under this general category. Some fairly detailed subclassification is therefore desirable. However, precisely because of the rather amorphous character of relations of determinateness, a clear-cut intuitive subdivision is not easy. I have decided that relations of determinateness fall into three primary types: (1) argumentative, (2) delimitational, and (3) associative. In argumentative relations, the truth of one proposition argues for

My label	Beekman's label (1974:300)	nature of the cause	nature of the effect	test phrase
Eng-Pur	means-purpose	Answers the question, "What action was performed for the given purpose?"	desired	in order that
Mns-E	means-result	Answers the question "How did the effect come about?"	definite and desired	as a result, in accordance with intention
Rsn-Rst	reason-result	Answers the question, "Why this effect?"	definite	as a result,
Stm-Rsp	?	Answers the question, "What stimulated or contributed this effect?"	definite	in response,
Ccs-Cex	concession-contraexpectation	Answers the question, "In spite of what did the effect come about?"	definite and unexpected	in spite of this,

or against the truth of another. In delimitational relations, one proposition helps to define, delimit, or complete the sense of another. In associative relations, two or more propositions completely distinct from one another are compared or associated in some way. It is important to note that associative relations deal with two *distinct* propositions. In contrast to this, in delimitational relations two propositions say basically the same thing, or else one proposition is needed to complete the other.

Each of these three categories (argumentative, delimitational, and associative) will in turn be subdivided below. The further subdivisions will help to make clear the exact differences between the major subtypes. For the moment, two examples of each major subtype must suffice.

Argumentative relations:

If you will, you can make me clean.	Cnd Cq	Mk. 1:40
For what does it profit a man to gain the whole world and forfeit his life?	Imp	
For what can a man give in return for his life?	Grd	Mk. 8:36f.

Delimitational relations:

They brought to him all who were sick or possessed with demons	Nom At	Mk. 1:32
All sins will be forgiven the sons of men, and whatever blasphemies they utter.	Gn Sp	Mk. 3:28

Associative relations:

Now John was clothed with camel's hair and had a leather girdle around his waist.	Cr Cr	Mk. 1:6
I have baptized you with water, but he will baptize you with the Holy Spirit.	— +	Mk. 1:8

6.1. *Argumentative relations*

In argumentative relations, one proposition argues for or against another. Arguments can be of three basic types: (1) if-then relations, where the truth of neither proposition is definitely affirmed; (2) argumentative support relations, where the truth is affirmed; and (3) either-or relations, where only one proposition is true. These will be called respectively Condition-Consequence, Grounds-Implication, and Either-Or.

6.11 *Condition-Consequence (Cnd-Cq)*

(Beekman calls this condition-consequence; 1974:303)

Condition-Consequence is the if-then relation. Neither of two propositions is explicitly affirmed to be true, but there is a positive inferential or argumentative connection between them.

If he does [sew new to old], the patch tears away from it, . . .	Cnd Cq	Mk. 2:21
---	-----------	----------

If a kingdom is divided against itself, Cnd
that kingdom cannot stand. Cq Mk. 3:24

No one can enter a strong man's house and
plunder his goods, Cnd
unless he first binds the strong man. Cq Mk. 3:27

Reasoning takes place *from* the proposition labeled "Condition" to the proposition labeled "Consequence." The propositions are combined in such a way that neither is affirmed to be true. The context, however, may indicate that the Condition is in fact known to be false (a contrafactual condition), or that it is not known to be either true or false, or even that it is known to be true. In the latter case, the conditionality imposed on the "Condition" is really only a rhetorical device. The force of the proposition relation is then to say, "If (as I know you do) you admit that x is true, you must also admit that y is true." For example,

If we have been united with him in a death
like his, Cnd
we shall certainly be united with him in a
resurrection like his Cq Rom. 6:5

In any case, the heart of the Condition-Consequence relation is that the Consequence *would* indeed follow once the Condition were admitted to be true. *If* the Condition holds, *then* the Consequence holds.

Note that in Mark 3:27, even though "if" is not used, a relation of Cnd-Cq holds. The reasoning in this case is backwards from an effect to its cause. If one enters a strong man's house and plunders his goods, it follows that (we know that) he has bound the strong man.

The presence of Condition-Consequence can be tested by seeing whether an "if" can be appropriately inserted. In Greek, this propositional relation is usually manifested by the conjunctions *ei* and *ean*.

Condition-Consequence, as well as the other argumentative relations Grounds-Implication and Either-Or, should be distinguished from cause-effect relations (relations of dynamicity). As I remarked earlier (3.2), the inferences involved in argumentative relations may

sometimes be based on a presupposed cause-effect relationship. But the inference, not the cause-effect relation, is the subject-matter or focus of discussion.

6.12 Grounds-Implication (*Grd-Imp*)

(Beekman calls this grounds-conclusion; 1974:306)

In the Grounds-Implication relation, two propositions are both affirmed to be true. One proposition (the Ground) argues in support of the other (the Implication). Thus:

For what does it profit a man, to gain the
whole world and forfeit his life? Imp
For what can a man give in return for his
life? Grd Mk. 8:36f.

David himself calls him Lord; Grd
so how is he his son? Imp Mk. 12:37

This poor widow has put in more than all
those who are contributing to the treasury. Imp
For they all contributed out of their
abundance; but she out of her poverty has
put in everything she had, her whole living. Grd Mk. 12:43f.

The speaker argues for a certain conclusion (Implication) on the basis of certain facts (Grounds). The conclusion logically follows from, is inferred from, or is supported by, these facts.

The presence of this propositional relation can be tested by putting the two propositions (or larger units) in the order with the Ground first and the Implication second. If the relation is indeed one of Grounds-Implication, it should be possible to appropriately insert "therefore" or "hence" between the two. In Greek, the sequence Grounds-Implication is frequently joined using *oun*, *hōste*, or *ara* (somewhat less frequently, *dia touto*). The sequence Implication-Grounds is frequently joined using *gar* (Healey, 1976).

6.13 Either-Or (*Et-Or*)

(Beekman calls this alternation; 1974:292)

In the Either-Or relation, neither proposition by itself is affirmed to

be true. Rather, one of the two propositions is held to be true, and the truth of one excludes the truth of the other. *Either* one is true or the other is true. Thus this relation is distinguished from the other two by the fact that the two propositions are in tension with one another rather than reinforcing one another.

Which is easier, to say to the paralytic, "Your sins are forgiven,"	Et
or to say, "Rise, take up your pallet and walk?"	Or Mk. 2:9
(Is it lawful on the sabbath) to do good or to do harm	Et Or Mk. 3:4
Is a lamp brought in to be put under a bushel, or under a bed, . . . ?	Et Or Mk. 4:21

The three types of argumentative relation can be easily distinguished from one another by several means: the kind of connecting conjunctions that are appropriate (if-then; therefore, hence; either-or); the number of propositions affirmed to be true; the question of whether the two propositions argumentatively reinforce one another positively or negatively. The following table summarizes the differences.

My label	Beekman's label (1974:300, 292)	appropriate connecting conjunction	number of propositions affirmed to be true	positive argumentative reinforcement?
Cnd-Cq	condition-consequence	if . . . then	0	+
Grd-Imp	grounds-conclusion	therefore, hence	2	+
Et-Or	alternation	either . . . or	1	—

6.2. Delimitational relations

In delimitational relations, one proposition helps to define, delimit, or complete the sense of another. Delimitational relations can

in turn be subdivided into (1) completive relations, (2) equivalence relations, and (3) the specification relation, or General-Specific relation. In completive relations, one proposition is necessary to fill an informational gap in the other. In equivalence relations, both propositions say the same thing. In the General-Specific relation, one proposition specifies in more detail or in specific cases the content of the other.

6.21. Completive relations

In completive relations, the proposition which is grammatically the main proposition almost always has an informational gap filled by the other proposition.

6.211. Matrix-Complement (Mtx-Cmp)

(Beekman calls this content; 1974:311)

In the Matrix-Complement relation, an informational gap occurs in the "Matrix" proposition. The gap is filled by another proposition, the "Complement." The complement proposition is itself directly used and taken up as a constituent in the main proposition. Thus:

(He) said to him, "I will; be clean."	Mtx Cmp Mk. 1:41
It was reported that he was at home.	Mtx Cmp Mk. 2:1
You may know that the Son of man has authority on earth to forgive sins	Mtx Cmp Mk. 2:10
He told his disciples to have a boat ready for him. . . .	Mtx Cmp Mk. 3:9

In these examples the "Complement" proposition is the content of what is said, reported, or known. The main proposition is a proposition about this Complement. The main proposition is actually formed from both components, Matrix plus Complement. The Matrix is incomplete by itself; it is a fragment of a proposition rather than a full proposition.

Contrast this now with the Nominal-Attribute relation.

6.212. *Nominal-Attribute (Nom-At)*

(cf. Beekman's identification and comment; 1974:311)

In the Nominal-Attribute relation, an informational gap occurs that is filled by the giving of further information about a constituent of the main proposition. Thus:

They brought to him all	Nom
who were sick or possessed with demons.	At Mk. 1:32
Offer for your cleansing what	Nom
Moses commanded	At Mk. 1:44
(He) ate the bread of the Presence,	Nom
which it is not lawful for any but the priests	
to eat.	At Mk. 2:26
(Satan) takes away the word	Nom
which is sown in them	At Mk. 4:15

In these examples, the proposition labeled "Attribute" gives further information about a constituent of the main proposition (labeled "Nom"). "Who were sick or possessed with demons" gives more information about "all"; "Moses commanded" gives more information about "what"; and so forth. I have included under the Nom-At relation two types of modification. In the first, represented by Mark 1:32; 1:44; and 4:14, the Attribute proposition *restricts* a constituent in the main or Nominal proposition. For example, in Mark 1:32 "all" is not comprehensive "all," but "all" of the specific group designated by "who were sick or possessed with demons." In Mark 4:15 "the word" is not any word, but rather specifically "the word which is sown in them." In the second type of modification, no effective restriction is placed on the main proposition by the Attribute proposition. Mark 2:26 is an example of this. For convenience, both types are called Nom-At.

Nom-At is distinguished from Mtx-Cmp. In the Nom-At relation, the At proposition tells more about a constituent of the Nom

proposition. But the At proposition is not itself a constituent of the Nom proposition. By contrast, the Cmp proposition *is* a constituent of the Mtx proposition. The Mtx proposition may be said to be about the Cmp proposition, whereas the Nom proposition is about something concerning which the At proposition gives further information.

6.22. *Equivalence relations*

In the case of equivalence relations, two propositions say the same thing. But this can take place in three variant ways.

6.221. *Contraction-Amplification (+1 +2; or Cn-Am)*

(Beekman calls this Amplification-contraction; 1974:298)

In Contraction-Amplification, the same fundamental fact is stated twice, usually with similar words. But one proposition adds a number of details absent from the other. This type of propositional relation is rare in Greek, but occurs in Hebrew poetry, in connection with parallelism.

Here are my mother and my brothers!	+1
Whoever does the will of God is my brother,	
and sister, and mother.	+2 Mk. 3:34f.
May those who sow in tears reap with shouts	
of joy!	+1
He that goes forth weeping, bearing the seed	
for sowing, shall come home with shouts of joy,	
bringing his sheaves with him.	+2 Ps. 126:5f.

6.222. *Positive-Positive (++)*

(cf. Beekman's "equivalence"; 1974:297)

In Positive-Positive, the same proposition is reiterated, usually for emphasis.

For there is nothing hid, except to be made	
manifest;	+
nor is anything secret, except to come to light.	+ Mk. 4:22

With what can we compare the kingdom of God,	+	
or what parable shall we use for it?	+	Mk. 4:30
Already you are filled!	+	
Already you have become rich!	+	I Cor. 4:8

6.223. Positive-Negation of Negative (+ - -)

In the case of the Positive-Negation of Negative relation, the same proposition is reiterated in positive and in negative form.

Whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has forgiveness,	— —	
but is guilty of an eternal sin.	+	Mk. 3:29
With many such parables he spoke the word to them, . . .	+	
he did not speak to them without a parable.	— —	Mk. 4:33f.
A false witness will not go unpunished,	— —	
and he who utters lies will perish.	+	Prov. 19:9

This relation should be carefully distinguished from the case where two different propositions are set forth, each in tension or in conflict with the other (see the Opposition relation, 6:33).

In a Positive-Negation of Negative relation, the two propositions say basically the same thing. Therefore, the proposition which is expressed negatively must really be a double negative. In order to say essentially the same thing as the positive proposition, a statement which already has a negative element within it, in the form of an antonym, must in turn be negated.

For example, in Mark 3:29, "never" is the obvious negative word in the first proposition. It is opposite to the word "eternal" in the second proposition. But "forgiveness" is also an antonym to "guilty" in the second proposition. Thus the first proposition is a double negative of the second. The net effect of the doubling is that it reinforces the positive statement of the second proposition. In Mark 4:33f., "did not speak" corresponds to "spoke," and "without a

parable" corresponds to "with many such parables." In Proverbs 19:9, "will not go" corresponds to the positive "will," while "unpunished" corresponds to "perish." The doubling of the negative in all these cases distinguishes the Positive-Negation of Negative relation from the Opposition relation (6.33).

6.23. General-Specific (Gn-Sp)

(Beekman calls this generic-specific; 1974:298)

The General-Specific relation holds between two different but closely related propositions. One proposition specifies in more detail or in specific cases the content of the other. This differs from the Contraction-Amplification relation mainly in that the two propositions involved do not say the same thing, and therefore the effect of close parallelism is lost.

But Jesus rebuked him,	Gn	
saying, "Be silent, and come out of him!"	Sp.	Mk. 1:25
(Other seeds) brought forth grain,	Gn	
growing up and increasing and yielding thirty-fold, and sixtyfold and a hundredfold.	Sp.	Mk. 4:8
. . . how much the Lord has done for you,	Gn	
and how he has had mercy on you.	Sp	Mk. 5:19
And they were astonished beyond measure,	Gn	
saying, "He has done all things well; . . ."	Sp	Mk. 7:37

6.3. Associative relations

Associative relations hold between two propositions quite distinct from one another. The propositions are much more distinct than in the above case of the General-Specific relation. But the two propositions still relate to the same topic. Associative relations are of three types: (1) exact comparison, where the point of comparison is made specific; (2) coordination; and (3) opposition.

6.31. Exact comparison

In exact comparison, the comparison can be of three types:

(1) proportional (the more . . . the more); (2) static (. . . more than . . .); (3) analogical or structural (x is like y). These are called respectively Independent Variable-Dependent Variable (IV-DV); Greater-Lesser (Gt-Ls); Standard-Thing Compared (Std-TC).

6.311. *Independent Variable-Dependent Variable (IV-DV)*

In the case of the Independent Variable-Dependent Variable relation, there is a dynamic proportionality between the two propositions, a proportionality which admits varying degrees of realization. *To the degree* that one holds, the other holds.

The more he charged them,	IV	
the more zealously they proclaimed it.	DV	Mk. 7:36

The more they were oppressed,	IV	
the more they multiplied and the more they spread abroad.	DV	Ex 1:12

The "Independent Variable" label is given to the proposition whose degree of realization "governs" the other or determines it. The IV-DV relation is a rather uncommon one; it is almost always manifested by an expression like "the more . . . the more" or "the less . . . the less."

6.312. *Greater-Lesser (Gt-Ls)*

In the case of the Greater-Lesser relation, the comparison is still a comparison in degree, but it is fixed or static instead of dynamic. One action or event is more than or greater than another.

To love him with all the heart, . . . , and to love one's neighbor as oneself, is much more than	Gt	
(to offer) all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices.	Ls	Mk. 12:33

They loved the praise of men more than (they loved) the praise of God.	Gt	
	Ls	John 12:43

6.313. *Standard-Thing Compared (Std-TC)*

(Beekman calls this comparison; 1974:294)

In the Standard-Thing Compared relation, an analogy is drawn between two structures.

They did to him whatever they pleased,	TC	
as it is written of him.	Std	Mk. 9:13
(The disciples) found it	TC	
as he had told them.	Std	Mk. 14:16

In these cases, the Standard is the "known quantity" in the comparison, while the "Thing Compared" is the immediate concern of the discussion. For this purpose, the word "like" or "as" is often used in English. In Greek, *hōs* and *kathōs* are available.

6.32. *Coordination (Cr-Cr)*

(Beekman calls this matched support; 1974:292)

Coordination represents, in a way, a form of associative relation almost at the opposite extreme from exact comparison. In cases of Coordination, one is merely presented with two propositions concerning a common subject-matter or topic—nothing more. One is confronted, then, with a quite vague relation between the two.

Now John was clothed with camel's hair,	Cr	
and had a leather girdle around his waist,	Cr	
and ate locusts and wild honey.	Cr	Mk. 1:6

He healed many who were sick with various diseases,	Cr	
and cast out many demons.	Cr	Mk. 1:34

He sternly charged him,	Cr	
and sent him away at once, . . .	Cr	Mk. 1:43

They were all amazed	Cr	
and glorified God, . . .	Cr	Mk. 2:12

6.33. *Opposition (+ —)*

(Beekman calls this contrast; 1974:295)

In the Opposition relation, two propositions are in factual tension

or in contrast to one another.

And it has often cast him into the fire
and into the water, to destroy him;
but if you can do anything, have pity
on us and help us. — Mk. 9:22

For your hardness of heart he wrote you
this commandment. —
But from the beginning of creation, "God
made them male and female. . . ." + Mk. 10:5-6

To you has been given the secret of the
kingdom of God, +
but for those outside everything is in
parables — Mk. 4:11

The Opposition relation is quite distinct both from the Positive-Negation of Negative relation (6.223) and from the Concession-Contraexpectation relation (5.3). It differs from Positive-Negation of Negative in that the second proposition is in tension with rather than simply in reaffirmation of the first. It differs from Concession-Contraexpectation in that there is no cause-effect temporal sequence involved in Opposition.

7. *Relations of coherence (co-occurrence)*

In relations of coherence two propositions are connected chiefly by the fact that they denote events or states connected in time or space. The distinction needs to be preserved between these relations and relations of determinateness. Relations of determinateness may sometimes deal with either simultaneous or successive events. But for such relations the time or space element is less important than common topic. Relations of coherence are of three subtypes: (1) chronological succession (Antecedent-Subsequent); (2) simultaneity (Simultaneous-Simultaneous); and (3) setting (Setting-Happening).

7.1. *Antecedent-Subsequent (An-Sb)* (Beekman calls this chronological sequence; 1974:291)

In the Antecedent-Subsequent relation, two propositions designate or talk about two successive events. The proposition referring to the earlier event is to be labeled "Antecedent" (An), and the proposition referring to the later event is to be labeled "Subsequent" (Sb).

In those days Jesus came from Nazareth of
Galilee An
and was baptized by John in the Jordan. Sb Mk. 1:9

They left their father Zebedee in the boat
with the hired servants, An
and followed him. Sb Mk. 1:20

And immediately he left the synagogue,
and entered the house of Simon and Andrew An
Sb Mk. 1:29

The An-Sb relation should be carefully distinguished from cause-effect relations, that is, relations of dynamicity. In relations of dynamicity one event (the cause) always precedes the other (the effect). However, the relation between the two events is not merely one of temporal succession. Rather, the discourse indicates that the earlier event causally affected or was causally connected with the later event. On the other hand, if the discourse gives little or no attention to any causal connection, but rather emphasizes simply temporal succession, the relation is one of An-Sb.

7.2. *Simultaneous-Simultaneous (Sim-Sim)* (Beekman calls this simultaneity; 1974:292)

In the Simultaneous-Simultaneous relation, two propositions designate or talk about two simultaneous events. Both events need to be of roughly equal importance to the discourse (in contrast to the Setting-Happening relations below, 7.3).

(And the unclean spirit,) convulsing him Sim
and crying with a loud voice, . . . Sim Mk. 1:26

Now some of the scribes were sitting there Sim
questioning in their hearts. Sim Mk. 2:6

He was always crying out,	Sim
and bruising himself with stones.	Sim Mk. 5:5

In the Simultaneous-Simultaneous relation, the relation between the propositions is *primarily* their temporal one, their relation of simultaneity. In other cases, the events may still be temporally simultaneous, yet the relation between the propositions may be primarily topical:

Now John was clothed with camel's hair,	Cr
and had a leather girdle around his waist,	Cr
and ate locusts and wild honey.	Cr Mk. 1:6

In the end, the difference between these two types of relation is a difference of degree. But in practice, the decision is usually not too hard to make. The relation of simultaneity may be expected most frequently in narrative discourse (since narrative discourse tends to give a certain emphasis to the chronological order of events). Relations of coordination and other types of relations of determinateness may be expected more frequently in expository or hortatory discourse, where there is usually more emphasis on subject-matter than on chronology.

7.3. *Settings*

In relations of Setting and Happening, one proposition is subordinated to another. The subordinate proposition gives the setting or background in which the event described in the main proposition takes place. Often, a setting is introduced not merely for one main proposition but for a whole series of propositions dealing with the happenings in this particular setting. Thus Setting propositions frequently occur at the beginning or end of narrative paragraphs or sections.

Settings can be of three kinds: (1) time settings (Time Setting-Happening); (2) location settings (Location Setting-Happening); and (3) circumstantial settings (Circumstance Setting-Happening).

7.31. *Time Setting-Happening (TSet-Hap)* (Beekman calls this time; 1974:309)

In the Time Setting-Happening relation, one proposition tells the time *when* the event occurred which is referred to in the other proposition. The proposition answering the "when?" question is subordinate to a second main proposition. The main proposition tells what event happened at or during this time. The main proposition is the "Happening," while the subordinate proposition furnishes the "Time Setting."

When he came up out of the water,	TSet
immediately he saw the heavens opened and	
the Spirit descending upon him like a dove.	Hap Mk. 1:10

When he returned to Capernaum after some	
days,	TSet
it was reported that he was at home.	Hap Mk. 2:1

As long as they have the bridegroom with	
them,	TSet
they cannot fast.	Hap Mk. 2:19

It was now two days before the Passover and	
the feast of Unleavened Bread.	TSet

And the chief priests and the scribes were	
seeking how to arrest him by stealth,	
and kill him; . . .	Hap Mk. 14:1

In the example from Mark 2:1, the proposition labeled TSet includes some information about location as well as time. Hence one might think of using the category "LSet." But the construction as it stands emphasizes more the time at which the main event (the report) took place.

Mark 14:1 is an example of a case where the TSet provides a setting for a whole series of following propositions.

7.32. *Location Setting-Happening (LSet-Hap)* (Beekman calls this location; 1974:309)

In the Location Setting-Happening relation, one proposition tells the place *where* the event occurred which is referred to in the other

proposition. The proposition answering the "where?" question is subordinate to a second, main proposition. The main proposition tells what event happened at or in the given location. The main proposition is the "Happening," while the subordinate proposition furnishes the "Location Setting."

Again he entered the synagogue, and a man was there who had a withered hand. And they watched him, . . .	LSet Hap	Mk. 3:1
While he was at Bethany in the house of Simon the leper, as he sat at table, a woman came with an alabaster jar of ointment of pure nard, very costly, and she broke the jar. . . .	LSet Hap	Mk. 14:3
As Peter was below in the courtyard, one of the maids of the high priest came; . . .	LSet Hap	Mk. 14:66

In the above examples, the proposition labeled "LSet" specifies the location in which a whole series of events occurred. The propositions labeled "LSet" are therefore actually functioning as a Location Setting for a whole paragraph which is the "Happening."

Note that in some cases, a Location Setting is joined grammatically to what follows by a *temporal* word ("while," "as"). Nevertheless, these are still instances of Location Setting. In each case, the primary function of the subordinate proposition is to offer information with regard to location. It answers the question, "Where?"

7.33. Circumstance Setting-Happening (CSet-Hap) (Beekman calls this Circumstance; 1974:310)

In the Circumstance Setting-Happening relation, one proposition provides information about a circumstance or a circumstantial event simultaneous with the main action. The proposition referring to the circumstantial material is labeled "CSet." The main proposition, referring to the main event, is labeled "Hap." The CSet-Hap relation between propositions differs from the Simultaneous-Simultaneous relation. In the latter relation, both events are of roughly equal

importance; both are given roughly equal prominence. In the Circumstance Setting-Happening relation, only one event is prominent.

And passing along by the Sea of Galilee, he saw Simon and Andrew the brother of Simon. . . .	CSet Hap	Mk. 1:16
And immediately there was in their synagogue a man with an unclean spirit; and he cried out, "What have you to do with us, Jesus of Nazareth? Have you come to destroy us? I know who you are, the Holy One of God."	CSet Hap	Mk. 1:23ff.
Whenever the unclean spirits beheld him, they fell down before him and cried out, . . .	CSet Hap	Mk. 3:11
Immediately the girl got up and walked; for she was twelve years old.	Hap CSet	Mk. 5:42

In these cases, as with other cases of Setting-Happening, one must not attend only to the grammatical construction and the conjunction involved, but also to the actual relation between the propositions. For example, in the example from Mark 3:11, "whenever" is used. One might therefore be tempted to consider this as a case of TSet-Hap or even as Sim-Sim. But the clause "whenever the unclean spirits beheld him" is clearly subordinate to, and almost incidental to, the main part "they fell down before him and cried out." Moreover, the purpose of adding the extra clause is not so much to specify merely the *time*, but to specify an event, namely, that the spirits beheld him. The subordinate character of the first clause shows that it is a "Setting" rather than one component of a relation of Sim-Sim. The fact that time in itself is not important shows that it is a "Circumstance Setting."

7.4. Summary of types of relations of coherence

The types of relations of coherence are distinguished from one another by several criteria: (a) are the two elements temporally

successive or temporally simultaneous; (b) is one of the two propositions considerably more prominent than the other; (c) is information about time, about location, or about circumstantial events the most important.

My label	Beekman's label	temporal succession?	equal prominence?	time, location, or circumstance important?
An-Sb	chronological sequence	yes	yes	
Sim-Sim	simultaneity	no; rather simultaneity	yes	no
TSet-Hap	time	usually no	no	time
LSet-Hap	location	usually no	no	location
CSet-Hap	circumstance	yes or no	no	circumstance

8. Summary of all types of propositional relations

5. Relations of <i>dynamicity</i> (cause-effect)			
Eng-Pur	5.1	Engagement-Purpose	He sawed off the branch in order to make it fall.
Mns-E	5.11	Means-End	By sawing off the branch he made it fall.
Rsn-Rst	5.2	Reason-Result	The branch fell because he sawed it off.
Stm-Rsp	5.21	Stimulus-Response	The comedian cracked a joke and the audience laughed.
Ccs-Cex	5.3	Concession- Contraexpectation	Though he sawed off the branch, it did not fall.
6. Relations of <i>determinateness</i> (topical)			
6.1 Argumentative			
Cnd-Cq	6.11	Condition- Consequence	If he saws off the branch, it will fall.
Grd-Imp	6.12	Grounds- Implication	The branch fell. Hence, he must have sawed it off.
Et-Or	6.13	Either-Or	Either the branch fell off or he did not saw it off.
6.2 Delimitational relations			
6.21 Completive relations			
Mtx-Cmp	6.211	Matrix-	He thought that John was crazy.

Nom-At	Complement	
	6.212 Nominal-Attribute	He presented a gift tied with ribbons.
	6.22 Equivalence relations	
+1 +2	6.221 Contraction-Amplification	He went; he went sideways through the woods.
+ +	6.222 Positive-Positive	I will meditate on your law; I will think on your statutes.
+ - -	6.223 Positive-Negation of Negative	He punished them; he did not spare them.
Gn-Sp	6.23 General-Specific	He presented a gift; he gave him four horses.
6.3 Associative relations		
IV-DV	6.31 Exact comparison	
	6.311 Independent Variable-Dependent Variable	The more Bill farms, the more he succeeds.
	6.312 Greater-Lesser	Bill farms better than John.
Gt-Ls	6.313 Standard-Thing Compared	Bill farms like John.
Std-TC		
Cr-Cr	6.32 Coordination	Bill bought apples and sold oranges.
- +	6.33 Opposition	Bill farms but John teaches.
7. Relations of <i>coherence</i> (common environment; co-occurrence)		
An-Sb	7.1 Antecedent-Subsequent	We talked. Afterward I remembered what we said.
Sim-Sim	7.2 Simultaneous-Simul.	He constantly talked and flitted his eyes.
7.3 Setting		
TSet-Hap	7.31 Time Setting-Happening	When night came, he sawed off the branch.
LSet-Hap	7.32 Location Setting-Hap.	He was in his woodlot. He sawed off the branch.
CSet-Hap	7.33 Circumstance Setting-Hap.	He sawed off the branch while he was in a bad mood.

9. Dealing with commands and questions

The types of propositional relations that I have discussed have been primarily viewed as relations between statements, assertions, utterances of fact, and the like. A few examples have included commands

and questions as well. But neither commands nor questions have been discussed separately. It would be possible to discuss commands and questions using an entirely different set of categories from those introduced in sections 5-7. But this does not seem to me to be either efficient or reasonable. In almost all cases commands and questions can be subsumed under the same categories used for statements—provided that one is willing to make a few adjustments.

9.1. *Dealing with commands*

In most cases, commands can be dealt with in the same way as statements or assertions. If any difficulty is encountered, the commands can be converted into statements whose meaning is close to that of the original command. A command "Come!" can be converted either into a future prediction "You will come," a future wish "I wish that you would come," or into a moral observation "You ought to come." Similarly for other commands. Thus:

Lay your hands on her. Mk. 5:23

Go,
show yourself to the priest,
and offer for your cleansing what Moses
commanded, . . . Mk. 1:44

Converted into future prediction, these are:

You will lay your hands on her.

You will go,
you will show yourself to the priest,
and you will offer for your cleansing what Moses commanded, . . .

Converted into future wishes, these are:

(I wish that) you would lay your hands on her.

(I wish that) you would go
show yourself to the priest,
and offer for your cleansing what Moses commanded, . . .

Converted into moral observations, these are:

You ought to lay your hands on her.

You ought to go,
show yourself to the priest,
and offer for your cleansing what Moses commanded, . . .

Generally speaking, the command should be converted into a statement form that most nearly corresponds to its original force. Thus for the original, "Lay your hands on her," the force is close to "(I wish that) you would lay your hands on her." There is no indication that Jairus thinks he has the right to make a moral pronouncement to the effect, "You ought to lay your hands on her."

When commands are converted to these forms, one can often see clearly their connections with other commands or with surrounding declarative statements. Consider the following:

See that you say nothing to any one;
but go, show yourself to the priest, . . . Mk. 1:44

For there is nothing hid, except to be made
manifest; nor is anything secret, except to
come to light.
If any man has ears to hear,
let him hear. Mk. 4:22f.

My little daughter is at the point of death.
Come and lay your hands on her,
so that she may be made well, and live. Mk. 5:23

Ask me whatever you wish,
and I will grant it. Mk. 6:22

The commands or requests are converted into statements as follows:

You ought to see (be careful) that you say nothing
to anyone; —
but you ought to go, show yourself to the priest, . . . +

For there is nothing hid, except to be made manifest;

nor is anything secret, except to come to light Stm
 If any man has ears to hear, Cnd Rsp
 he should hear. Cq
 My little daughter is at the point of death. Grd
 (I wish) that you would come and lay your Mns
 hands on her, E
 so that she may be made well, and live Imp
 You will ask me for whatever you wish Stm
 and I will grant it. Rsp

One particularly frequent way in which commands or exhortations appear is in connection with grounds for the exhortation (as in Mk. 5:23). Thus:

Work out your own salvation with fear and Imp
 trembling, Grd
 for God is at work in you, both to will and Phil. 2:12f.
 to work for his good pleasure.

The frequency of this construction has caused some to want to give it a separate name, motivation-exhortation (or exhortation-motivation). See 10.2.

9.2. Dealing with questions

Some special thought is necessary for dealing with questions. These, like commands, do not always fit as smoothly into a discourse analysis as do the statements.

First, when one person's question is followed in the discourse by someone else's answer, the situation is almost always to be viewed as a special case of Stimulus-Response.

(The people) said to him, "Why do John's Stm
 disciples and the disciples of the Pharisees Cnd
 fast, but your disciples do not fast? Rsp
 And Jesus said to them, "Can the wedding Grd
 guests fast while the bridegroom is with them? Mns
 As long as they have the bridegroom with E
 them, they cannot fast." Imp Mk. 2:18f.

(She) said to her mother, "What shall I ask?" Stm
 And she said, "The head of John the baptizer." Rsp Mk. 6:24

A second type of answer is the so-called rhetorical question. In this case, either the answer is given by the same person who asked the question, or else no answer is given and none is expected. The question "answers itself." If there is any difficulty in assessing such a question, it should be converted into a positive assertion. One should ask, "What positive statement does the person indicate that he has in mind when he asks this question?" Let us look at some examples.

What is this? Mk. 1:27
 A new teaching!

Why does this man speak thus? Mk. 2:7
 It is blasphemy!
 Who can forgive sins but God alone?

Can the wedding guests fast while the bridegroom Mk. 2:19
 is with them? As long as they have the bride-
 groom with them, they cannot fast.

Why do you make a tumult and weep? Mk. 5:39
 The child is not dead but sleeping.

In Mark 1:27 and 2:19, the question is answered by the same person or people who asked it. In Mark 2:7 and 5:39, no direct answer is given. Therefore all four contain rhetorical questions. When the questions are converted to statements, the four passages can be analyzed as follows:

This is a strange something. Gn
 A new teaching. Sp Mk. 1:27
 The man ought not to speak thus. +
 It is blasphemy! + Imp
 No one can forgive sins but God alone. Grd Mt. 2:7

The wedding guests cannot fast while the bridegroom is with them.	+	
As long as they have the bridegroom with them, they cannot fast.	+	Mk. 2:19
You should not make a tumult and weep.	Imp	
The child is not dead but sleeping.	Grd	Mk. 5:39

For a further discussion of the problem of dealing with rhetorical questions, see Beekman-Callow (1974:229-248).

10. *Some special types of propositional relation.*

If necessary, the types of propositional relation introduced in sections 5-7 could be further subdivided. But for most purposes it appears to me that such subdivision is not necessary. Beyond a certain point, further subdivision becomes a kind of hair-splitting exercise that does not really yield much more information about the passage under study.

For general purposes, then, I recommend the use of the categories in sections 5-7 without further subdivision. However, a few further subdivisions appear to me to be occasionally useful. I will therefore explain them and discuss them in this section.

10.1. *Question-Answer (Qn-An)*

(cf. Beekman's conversational exchanges; 1974:292)

A question-answer sequence is usually a special case of the propositional relation Stimulus-Response (5.21). The question as the Stimulus elicits the answer as a Response. However, the question-answer sequence, and more generally the sequence dialog initiator-dialog reply, is such a frequent one that a special notation for it may sometimes be useful. Here are some examples.


And Jesus asked him, "What is your name?"	Qn	
He replied, "My name is Legion; for we are many."	An	Mk. 5:9
(Jesus) said, "Who touched my garments?"	Qn	
And his disciples said to him, "You see the		

crowd pressing around you, and yet you say, 'Who touched me?' "	An	Mk. 5:31
(She) said to her mother, "What shall I ask?"	Qn	
And she said, "The head of John the baptizer."	An	Mk. 6:24
^{35b} (His disciples) said, "This is a lonely place, and the hour is now late; ³⁶ send them away, to go into the country and villages round about and buy themselves something to eat."	DI	
^{37a} But he answered them, "You give them something to eat."	DR	
^{37b} And they said to him, "Shall we go and buy two hundred denarii worth of bread, and give it to them to eat?"	DI	
³⁸ And he said to them, "How many loaves have you? Go and see."	DR	Mk. 6:35-38

In this passage Mark 6:35-38, "DI" stands for "dialog initiator," and "DR" stands for "dialog reply." Mark 6:37b-38 might be considered a question-answer sequence. But Mark 6:38 is not really an answer to the question of 6:37b. Moreover, I judge that the question of 6:37b is not a "real" question, but a rhetorical question. It means, "We can't do that without spending more money than we have." Hence the sequence 6:37b-38 is better analyzed as dialog initiator (DI) followed by dialog reply (DR).

One additional complicating factor appears in Mark 6:35-38. Jesus' answer, "you give them something to eat" (vs. 37a), provokes the reply of the disciples in the next line (vs. 37b). The whole conversation can be considered as a conversation with four parts (vss. 35b-36, 37a, 37b, 38). Each part stimulates the next as a response to it. Hence the conversation is in fact more complex than the above analysis into DI-DR components indicates. Such complexities are largely outside the scope of this paper. Two easy ways of dealing with them are as follows. (1) The first dialog exchange (vss. 35b-

37a) is a Stimulus for the second (vss. 37b-38), which is a Response to this Stimulus. (2) The middle parts of the conversation, verse 37a and verse 37b, have a dual function. Each is simultaneously a Response to what precedes it and a Stimulus to what follows it. The following two alternative analyses result.



10.2. Order-Execution (Ord-Exc)

Another special type of Stimulus-Response relation (5.21) is the relation between the giving of an order and the execution of the order. The giving of the order as Stimulus elicits the execution of the order as Reponse. Here are some examples.

Taking her by the hand he said to her, "Talitha cumi"; which means, "Little girl, I say to you, arise."	Ord	
And immediately the girl got up and walked; . . .	Exc	Mk. 5:41f.
Then he commanded them all to sit down by companies upon the green grass.	Ord	
So they sat down in groups, by hundreds and by fifties.	Exc	Mk. 6:39f.
And Jesus stopped and said, "Call him."	Ord	
And they called the blind man, saying to him, "Take heart; rise, he is calling you."	Exc	Mk. 10:49

10.3. Motivation-Exhortation (Mtv-Exh)

The Grounds-Implication relation (6.12) occurs fairly frequently with the Implication in the form of an exhortation or command. The "Grounds" then give grounds, reasons, or motivations for certain behavior; and the "Implication" then specifies what behavior is involved. The following are examples.

My little daughter is at the point of death.	Grd	
Come and lay your hands on her, so that she may be made well, and live.	Imp	Mk. 5:23
Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling;	Imp	
for God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure.	Grd	Phil. 2:12f.
We are not of the night or of darkness.	Grd	
So then let us not sleep, as others do, but let us keep awake and be sober.	Imp	I Thess. 5:5f.

If it is desirable to have a special notation for this, to distinguish it from other cases of Grounds-Implication, the "Grounds" can be labeled "Motivation" (Mtv) and the "Implication" labeled "Exhortation" (Exh).

I have a reason for not treating Motivation-Exhortation as a completely separate category. If one follows the prescription in section 9.1 for dealing with commands and imperatives, the relation Motivation-Exhortation does not seem to be so different from other cases of Grounds-Implication. If commands and imperatives do not require separate treatment most of the time, it seems desirable not to give them special treatment in this one case.

10.4. Types of Nominal-Attribute relation

In section 6:212 I noted that the Nominal-Attribute relation can be of two types. In the first type the proposition labeled "Attribute" gives further information about some item which is already defined in the main proposition. This may be called a Nominal-Comment relation. In the second type, the proposition labeled "Attribute" puts a *restriction* on some item in the main proposition. The "Attribute" proposition then actually serves to identify or classify the item more completely. This may be called a Nominal-Identification relation. The difference between the first and the second type is often manifested grammatically in the difference between an unrestrictive vs. a restrictive relative clause. Consider two examples.

The second man, who was wearing a turban, had been to India.
The second man who was wearing a turban had been to India.

The first example contains an unrestrictive relative clause, "who was wearing a turban." This clause gives a comment about the second man. But the second man is already fully defined in the context. Thus the relation may be diagrammed:

The second man, who was wearing a turban,	Comment
had been to India.	Nominal

The second example contains a restrictive relative clause "who was wearing a turban." In this case the extra clause is necessary to fully identify the man. The man spoken of is *not* the second man period; rather he is the second man among that particular group of men wearing turbans. The relation may therefore be diagrammed:

The second man who was wearing a turban	Identification
had been to India.	Nominal

10.41. *Nominal-Comment (Nom-Cmm)* (Beekman calls this Comment; 1974:311)

In the Nominal-Comment relation, one proposition ("Comment") is about a part of the other proposition ("Nominal"). The Comment proposition gives further information about some item. But that item is already identified in context.

(He) ate the bread of the Presence,	Nom
which it is not lawful for any but the priests to eat.	Cmm Mk. 2:26

It is like a grain of mustard seed,	Nom
which, when sown upon the ground, is the smallest of all the seeds on earth.	Cmm Mk. 4:31

There met him out of the tombs a man with an unclean spirit,	Nom
who lived among the tombs.	Cmm Mk. 5:2f.

10.42 *Nominal-Identification (Nom-Idn)* (Beekman calls this Identification; 1974:311)

In the Nominal-Identification relation, one proposition ("Identification") is about a part of the other proposition ("Nominal"). The Identification proposition gives information about some item in the main proposition. The additional information is necessary to identify the item in context.

They brought to him all	Nom
who were sick or possessed with demons.	Idn Mk. 1:32

(Satan) takes away the word	Nom
which is sown in them.	Idn Mk. 4:15

And the people came out to see what it was	Nom
that had happened.	Idn Mk. 5:14

The man who had been possessed with demons	Idn
begged him that he might be with him.	Nom Mk. 5:18

10.5. *Subclassification of temporal relations*

The main types of temporal relations, as discussed in 7.1 and 7.2, are the Antecedent-Subsequent relation and the Simultaneous-Simultaneous relation. But since events often take place over a *period* of time, neither of these is defined precisely. Both of these categories can be subdivided by paying closer attention to what kind of overlap (if any) exists between the temporal periods of two events. My analysis is dependent on Barbara Hollenbach's (1973a).

10.51. *Subclassifications of the Antecedent-Subsequent relation*

For the purpose of this subclassification, I will consider that an Antecedent-Subsequent relation holds between propositions describing events A and B only if the time spans of A and B have no noticeable overlap.

10.511. *Completely Antecedent-Completely Subsequent (CAAn-CSb)*

If the time spans of events A and B are separated by a temporal gap, the relation of propositions is CAAn-CSb.

10.512. *Immediately Antecedent-Immediately Subsequent (IAn-ISb)*

If the time spans of events A and B abut on one another, so that one event ends just as the other begins, the relation of propositions is IAn-ISb.

10.513. *Beginning-Postspan (B-Ps)*

If A is a "point" event, occupying no noticeable span of time itself but simply marking the beginning of event B, the propositional relation is B-Ps.

10.514. *Prespan-Terminus (Pre-T)*

If B is a "point" event, occupying no noticeable span of time itself but simply marking the end of event A, the propositional relation is Pre-T.

10.52. *Subclassifications of the Simultaneous-Simultaneous relation*

For the purposes of this subclassification, I will consider that a Simultaneous-Simultaneous relation holds between propositions describing events A and B only if the time spans of A and B have some overlap.

10.521. *Semiantecedent-Semisubsequent (SAn-SSb)*

If event A starts before event B, and B ends after A, and the two partly overlap, the propositional relation is SAn-SSb.

10.522. *Totally Simultaneous-Totally Simultaneous (TSim-TSim)*

If the time span of event A is exactly the same as the time span of event B, the propositional relation is TSim-TSim.

10.523. *Span-Included Event (Sp-IE)*

If event B takes place entirely within the time that event A is taking place, the propositional relation is Sp-IE.

10.53. *Summary of types of temporal relations*

The following diagram summarizes the different types of temporal

relations. The lines represent the time spans of the two events involved.

Label	Time spans of the events involved		
10.511 CAn-CSb	Completely Antecedent- Completely Subsequent	—	—
10.512 IAn-ISb	Immediately Antecedent- Immediately Subsequent	—	—
10.513 B-Ps	Beginning-Postspan	—	
10.514 Pre-T	Pre-span-Terminus	—	
10.521 SAn-SSb	Semiantecedent- Semisubsequent	—	—
10.522 TSim-TSim	Totally Simultaneous- Totally Simultaneous	—	—
10.523 Sp-IE	Span-Included Event	—	—


It must be recognized that many times a discourse does not provide enough information about the events to enable us to know with certainty the exact relation between temporal spans. In such a case, it is better to use the vague categories Antecedent-Subsequent or Simultaneous-Simultaneous.

11. *Using propositional relations to analyze a connected passage*

The propositional relations delineated in sections 5-7 can be used to analyze a connected passage like Isaiah 51:9-11. How is this done? It is done in a way analogous to what was done in section 4. In Section 4 I have analyzed Isaiah 51:9-11, using only three major categories for propositional relations: relations of dynamicity, relations of determinateness, and relations of coherence. Obviously a fuller analysis can be attempted now that we have a larger set of propositional relations.

The analysis proceeds in the same way as in section 4. Starting

with an ordinary topical outline of Isaiah 51:9-11, each major subdivision of the outline is considered. For each subdivision, one seeks to describe the propositional relation between its parts. Thus for the subdivision "1. Awake and put on strength (9a-d)" one seeks to describe the propositional relation between the two major parts "a. Awake (9a-b)" and "b. Put on strength (c-d)," I judge that this relation is a relation of Means-End. The awaking is done in order to put on strength. When all the subdivisions are analyzed in a similar fashion the result is as follows:



The process of analyzing each of the propositional relations in Isaiah 51:9-11 in order to obtain this end point is still far from simple. It is not simple to describe the weighing process that goes on in an instance where a given relation between propositions might plausibly be labeled in two (or more) distinct ways. Nor is it simple

to describe the way in which the context of two propositions will affect one's understanding of the propositional relation between them. To discuss all my decisions with respect to Isaiah 51:9-11 would take me far beyond the scope of this paper. I have provided a final product for inspection mainly so that readers may have some better idea what a final product is like.

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Chapter 11

JOHN R. WERNER*

Discourse Analysis of the Greek New Testament

A comparison of the paragraphing in any group of texts and/or translations of the New Testament will show that there are indeed some breaks that are universally obvious, but there has also been much difference among editors and translators as to the locations of most of the paragraph breaks. Were the authors (and was the Holy Spirit?) really that ambiguous about their (and His) larger units of thought, or does the text of the Greek New Testament contain paragraph indicators that would have been as clear to the original Greek hearers as were also the words and the grammatical patterns of their native language?

For many of the front-line missionaries of Wycliffe Bible Translators, that question is more than academic. There are more than four thousand tongues in which God's Word does not yet speak to men's hearts, and many of these languages are of such a structure that the last verb in each paragraph is always in a different form from the other verbs. Other languages demand a "heading" at the beginning of each new section. So, obviously, if a missionary is to translate God's Word into these tongues without making it sound strange to the readers, he needs to know where the Bible's paragraphs end. Every careful student of the Bible (as of any literature) wants to give as much attention to the larger units as to the smaller ones, working back and forth between the two and understanding each in the light of the other.

Bible translation for a group of people who have had little or no contact with civilization prerequisites an ability to win their acceptance, to learn their language, and to devise an effective, efficient writing system for it. Prepara-

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